Wright State University

CORE Scholar
Browse all Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2021

Hardware Security and Side Channel Power Analysis for 16X16
Booth Multiplier in 65nm CMOS Technology
Kanchan Vissamsetty
Wright State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Repository Citation
Vissamsetty, Kanchan, "Hardware Security and Side Channel Power Analysis for 16X16 Booth Multiplier in
65nm CMOS Technology" (2021). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 2448.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/2448

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE
Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu.

HARDWARE SECURITY AND SIDE CHANNEL POWER ANALYSIS FOR 16X16
BOOTH MULTIPLIER IN 65nm CMOS TECHNOLOGY

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Electrical Engineering

by

KANCHAN VISSAMSETTY
B.Tech., Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Kakinada, India, 2017

2021
Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
July 29, 2021
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION
BY Kanchan Vissamsetty ENTITLED Hardware Security and Side Channel Power Analysis for
16X16 Booth Multiplier in 65nm CMOS Technology BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Science in
Electrical Engineering.
_____________________________
Saiyu Ren, Ph.D.
Thesis Director
_____________________________
Fred D. Garber, Ph.D.
Interin Chair, College of Engineering
and Computer Science
Committee on Final Examination:
________________________________
Saiyu Ren, Ph.D.
________________________________
Ray Siferd, Ph.D.
________________________________
Marian K. Kazimierczuk, Ph.D.

________________________________
Barry Milligan, Ph.D.
Vice Provost for Academic Affairs
Dean of the Graduate School

ABSTRACT
Vissamsetty, Kanchan. M.S.E.E., Department of Electrical Engineering, Wright State
University, 2021. Hardware Security and Side Channel Power Analysis for 16X16 Booth
Multiplier in 65nm CMOS Technology.

As feature size is scaling down, dynamic power consumption reduces but static
power consumption increases. Due to the increase of static power, leakage currents as a
source, the information can be exploited successfully as a side-channel to recover the
secrets of the cryptographic implementations. An attacker who has access to the hardware
fabrication can insert a Trojan to the design to steal or alter information. In this thesis, a
post-fab static voltage variation/detection technique is developed to detect the potential
fabrication process Trojan insertion. The technique is, dividing the designed circuit into N
equal segments, where each segment would have same leakage current under certain input
patterns. One-ohm resistor is embedded between each segment network to ground path to
convert leakage current to voltage. Voltage drop on the one-ohm resistor is measured postfab to identify the authentic of the design mathematically and statistically by comparing all
the segment measure data. 250 Monte Carlo simulation results show that the minimum
Trojan is 0.0868% of the host circuit size with 100% detection probability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background
The rise of the digital computer in the beginning of the twentieth century brought

with it a new paradigm in secure communications- computer-based encryption algorithms
[6]. Encryption is a process in which some private set of data, often called a plain text, is
deterministically converted in a seemingly random set of data called cipher text. This
ciphertext is then later converted deterministically back into the plaintext through a process
called decryption [6]. If a person A is sharing a data to the other person B. Here, the only
two persons should know about the data. A third person C, should not get access to know
the information.
In the same way, Hardware Security is related to the Hardware Implementation of a
cryptographic algorithm. This means, the information of the Hardware Design should not
be leaked. The integrity of microelectronic circuit design and fabrication becomes a major
concern for Hardware Security. Providing a secure environment for microelectronic circuit
does not ensure integrity of the Hardware since fabrication is typically outsourced to
dedicated integrated circuits (IC) foundries [7].
Modern circuit technologies need to achieve different objectives like low energy
dissipation, high performance, high reliability, Manufacturability and cost effectiveness
are the fundamental concerns for industries too [1].
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Initially, CMOS logic is constructed in such a way that given idealized model of
transistor holds, no current should be consumed in any stable state. As feature size is
decreasing, dynamic power consumption reduces but static power consumption increases.
This is because, to comply with Moore’s law, the dimensions of metal-oxidesemiconductor field-effect transistors have faced an aggressive scaling process in order to
achieve the desired and predicted exponential increase over time in the number of
transistors that can be fabricated on a single integrated circuit (IC) of a given size [1]. In
the attempt to uphold this scaling factor, valuable properties of the technology were
sacrificed, as for example, the negligible current consumption in idle states.
Due to this, leakage currents as a source, the information can be exploited
successfully as a side-channel to recover the secrets of the cryptographic implementations.
An attacker who has access to hardware fabrication can insert a trojan to the circuit.
1.1.1

Side Channel Attack
Side Channel Attacks are Classified into passive and active attacks as shown in Fig.

1.1. Passive attack affects the host circuit’s timing, power consumption, and
electromagnetic emanation, which do not require an attacker to interfere with the
functionality or the operation of the device under attack [9]. An attacker is expected to
make a Hardware Trojan that is stealthy in nature and can evade detection through
conventional testing. Active attacks interfere with the operation of the device under attack,
where an attacker tends to influence how the device behaves, what operation it performs.
By actively controlling the behavior of the device, an attacker gains the advantage of
selectively extracting side-channel information [8].
2

Fig. 1.1 Taxonomy of general side channel attacks [8].
Hardware Trojan can be revealed by measuring differential side-channel parameters
of the attacked circuits. Power Analysis is a form of side-channel attack where power
consumption of the hardware is studied. Simple power analysis involves observation of
graphs of current used by device over time [3]. In a sophisticated version of the attack
named Differential power analysis, multiple power traces are statistically analyzed to
derive more robust information about the secret key [8]. Side channel analysis have the
advantage that they do not require triggering of the HT. Most of them rely on the existence
of the golden chip or golden model derived from the chip, in order to asses if a Hardware
Trojan is present in the IC. Recently, Side Channel Analysis methods, for Hardware Trojan
detection, that do not require a golden chip or golden model have been proposed [4].
However, even those methods require “golden” trusted measurements and simulation
models. Correlation Power Analysis is most effective analysis where the device leakage
model is well understood. Measured output is compared to models (like linear model which
implies some relationships between the variances of the different terms considered as
random variable) by using correlation factors to rate how much they leak [10].
Electromagnetic analysis is where electromagnetic radiations are emitted from IC [16].
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1.1.2

Power Analysis Attacks

Power Analysis attack is a type of side-channel attack, where devices power
consumption serves as leaked information used to exploit the particular device [11]. The
two factors which affect the power consumption are the Dynamic Power, which occurs
when state transitions take place [1], leakage power, associated with leakage current
generated in its off state [8].
1.1.3

Simple Power Analysis

A Simple Power Attack focuses in particular vulnerabilities of the algorithm design.
These vulnerabilities could leak enough sensitive information to compromise the
confidentiality of the encryption or even the secret key itself [13]. Simple Power Analysis
can be applied to single power trace, where attacker attempts to observe critical information
or secret keys from the trace. When Simple Power Analysis is applied to multiple power
traces captured from numerous occurrences, these traces are averaged to remove noise.
Attacker can apply a successful attack only when the recorded Power Consumption can
lead to critical information about the device being revealed [12].
1.1.4

Differential Power Analysis

As there is a lot of noise in the energy trace of cryptographic devices, Differential
Power Analysis requires larger number of traces, So that more data collection makes
Differential Power Analysis more powerful [8]. While system is encrypting or decrypting
data blocks, DPA tries to reveal secret key through power traces [14].

4

1.2 Research Philosophy
The main focus of the thesis is on the simple power analysis where the designed circuit
is divided into N equal segments as seen in Fig. 1.2, where each segment would have the
same leakage current under certain input patterns. Measure the voltage drop on the oneohm resistor embedded under the bottom of each segment current path for both pre-fab and
post-fab to identify the authentic of the design mathematically and statistically.

Fig. 1.2 Side-channel power analysis block diagram
1.3 Thesis organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces background and research
philosophy. Test Bench Circuit Design for HT Detection is presented in the Chapter 2 and
Hardware Trojan Detection over the Designed Test Bench Circuit is presented in the
chapter 3. Chapter 4 gives Hardware Trojan Detection Technique and Chapter 5 gives the
conclusion and future work.
5

2 Test Bench Circuit Design for HT Detection
A 16X16 Booth Multiplier schematic is implemented in CMOS 65nm technology as a
test bench circuit for our proposed hardware Trojan detection technique. The design is
divided into four equal segments to measure the voltage across one-ohm resistor in each
segment.
2.1 Design Blocks of 16X16 Booth Multiplier
16X16 Booth Multiplier consists of 8 partial product generations, each consists of
Booth Encoder, 3:1 Multiplexer, 31bit – adder/subtractor as shown in the Fig. 2.1.

Fig. 2.1 partial product generation []
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2.1.1 Booth Encoder
Booth action for the Booth Multiplication is shown in the Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Booth action for Booth Multiplication
yi yi-1 yi-2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

Increment
0
X
X
2x
-2x
-x
-x
0

When all the inputs of y(yi yi-1 yi-2) are same(000 or 111), then the increment is 0. When y
is (001 or 010), then the increment is x. when 011, the output is incremented by 2x. when
100, the output is incremented by -2x. When 101 or 110, the output is incremented by -x.
Table 2.2 shows the operation of a Booth Encoder.
Table 2.2 Truth table for Booth Encoder
Y2
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

Y1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

Y0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

Op
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0

S1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

S0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0

From Table 2.2, the minterm equations for each outputs are simplified as shown below
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Op = (Y2’ + Y1. Y0)’
{S1 = (Y2’. Y1’ + Y2. Y0 + Y1. Y0’)’
𝑆0 = (𝑌1′ . 𝑌0′ + 𝑌1. 𝑌0)′

(2.1)

Where Y2 Y1 Y0 are inputs and Op S1 S0 are outputs of the Booth encoder.
From the above equation (2.1), Booth encoder is designed as shown in the Fig. 2.2.

Fig. 2.2 Booth Encoder
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2.1.2 Multiplexer (mux)
The outputs of the booth encoder S1 and S0 acts as select lines S1 and S0 for 3:1 Mux.
Table 2.3 is the truth table for 2:1 Mux.
Table 2.3 Truth table of 2:1 mux
Select
Input
Input
Output
S
A
B
Y
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
From the Table 2.3, the simplified equation for 2:1 Mux is as shown below
Y= (S’×A) + (S×B)

(2.2)

From the equation (2.2), 2:1 Mux is designed as shown in the Fig. 2.3

Fig. 2.3 Schematic of 2:1 Mux
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3:1 Mux is designed using two 2:1 mux, where the output of the first 2:1 goes as one
input to the second 2:1 mux. The design of the 3:1 Mux is shown in the Fig. 2.4.

Fig. 2.4 Schematic of 3:1 mux
2.1.3 31Bit- adder/subtractor
31bit – adder/subtractor circuit is designed with the help of 1bit full adders and XOR2
gates.
Truth table for 1 bit full adder is shown in the Table 2.4., where A, B, Cin are inputs and
S, Cout are the outputs of the full adder.
Table 2.4 Truth table for 1bit Full Adder
A
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

B
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

Cin
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

S
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1

Cout
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1

From the Table 2.4, the optimized expressions for the outputs Sum(S) and Carry (Cout) are
expressed in the equation (2.3)
𝑆 = 𝐴 ⊕ 𝐵 ⊕ 𝐶𝑖𝑛
{
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝐴 × 𝐵 + 𝐴 × 𝐶𝑖𝑛 + 𝐵 × 𝐶𝑖𝑛

(2.3)
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From the equation (2.3), 1bit-full adder is designed with A, B, C as inputs and S, Cout as
outputs as shown in the Fig. 2.5.

Fig. 2.5 Schematic of 1bit- Full adder
31 bit-adder/subtractor is designed with the help of 31 1bit fulladders and XOR2 gates. The
design for the 31bit- adder/subtractor is shown in the Fig. 2.6.
2.2 16X16 Booth Multiplier
16X16 Booth Multiplier is designed with the help of Booth Encoder, 3:1 Mux, 31bit
Adder/Subtractor as shown in Fig. 2.8, with the help of Booth Algorithm, which is shown
in Fig. 2.7.

11

Fig. 2.6 Design of 31bit Adder/Subtractor

Fig. 2.7 Booth Algorithm
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Fig. 2.8 16X16 Booth Multiplier
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3 Hardware Trojan Detection over the Designed Test Bench
Circuit
The designed 16X16 Booth Multiplier circuit is divided into four hardware equal
segments Seg1 (bottom), Seg2, Seg3 and Seg4 (top) as shown in Fig. 3.1.

Fig. 3.1. Four segments of 16X16 Multiplier
14

The initial objective is to have all four segments with same pre-fab leakage current with
certain input pattern (s). After chip fabrication, measure four segment leakage current
individually and analyze the data statistically to find out if any of the segments is altered.
The pro of the technique is simple and con is not detectable if all segments are altered same.
After test bench circuit is implemented correctly and divided into 4-segment, next step
is to find input patterns to have same leakage current of four. For certain input patterns,
two segments (mostly segments-2 and 3) have the same leakage current and rest of the two
segments have leakage currents closer to the other two segments, but not the same. Though
the size of the segments is same, but the leakage current is not equal. This is because,
segment-2 is driven by segment-1 and segment-2 is driving segment-3. In the same way,
segment-3 is driven by segment-2 and the segment-3 is driving the segment-4. In summary
segment-2 and segment-3 have same driven and driving pattern. segment-1 and segment-4
have different patterns. Segment-1 is driving segment-2, but it is not driven by any segment.
Segment-4 is driven by segment-3, but, it is not driving any other segments.
Measure current off chip is complicated. One-ohm resistor is embedded at the
bottom of each segment to convert current to voltage. The Voltage across the one-ohm
resistor for each segment is measured to detect Trojan, when leakage current of the two
segments are same (Segment-2 and segment-3).
Dynamic current:
When state transition occurs, CMOS logic gates consume more data-dependent
current, due to the associated charging and discharging of the output capacitances. This
current is the main cause for the energy dissipation and information leakage.

15

Static or leakage current:
For any combination of stable input signals, only one of the two networks is allowed
to be active (i.e., switched on), while the other one be switched off. Conceptually, this
allows for a negligible power consumption in stable states. But, as feature size is decreasing
static power increases, which results in leakage current.
3.1 Developing input patterns having same leakage current:
For certain input patterns, the segments-2 and 3 are having same leakage current
for a Trojan Free circuit. They are:
Case1- When Input X = 0000 0000 0000 0000, Input Y = 0000 0000 0000 0000. Measured
voltage plot is shown in the Fig. 3.2.

Fig. 3.2. Measured Voltage across one-ohm resistor for case1
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Fig. 3.2. shows the measured voltage across one-ohm resistor for segments 2 and 3 are
equal for case1.
Case2- When Input X = 1111 1111 1111 1111, Input Y = 0000 0000 0000 0000. Measured
voltage plot is shown in the Fig. 3.3.

Fig. 3.3. Measured Voltage across one-ohm resistor for case2
Fig. 3.3. shows the measured voltage across one-ohm resistor for segments 2 and 3 are
equal for case2.
Case3- When Input X = 1111 1111 1111 1111, Input Y = 1111 0000 0000 0111. Measured
voltage plot is shown in the Fig. 3.4.
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Fig. 3.4. Measured Voltage across one-ohm resistor for case3
Fig. 3.4. shows the measured voltage across one-ohm resistor for segments 2 and 3 are
equal for case3.
3.2 Measured Voltage across one-ohm resistor when segment-2 is Trojan Attacked
Voltage across one-ohm resistor is measured, when segment-2 is attacked with
trojan. Buffer, Multiplexer, two multiplexers are considered as trojans. A Buffer is inserted
in one of the 31-bit Adder/Subtractor components in the Segment-2 in one of the post-fab
circuits named Buffer. A multiplexer is inserted in one of the 31-bit Adder/Subtractor
components in the Segment-2, named as Mux-1. A multiplexer is inserted one in each (total
two mux) 31-bit Adder/Subtractor components in the Segment-2, named as Mux-2. The
inserted Trojan acts as extra load to the circuit, which results in extra leakage current
through that path. Table 3.1 shows the TT (Typical-Typical) -values when these trojans are
inserted in the segment-2. In the table 3.1, three input patterns are considered named as
18

case1, case2, case3. For each case, voltage is measured when the three different trojans
(namely Buffer, Mux-1, Mux-2) are inserted in the segment-2. These measured voltage
values, when trojan inserted are compared with measured voltage values, when the circuit
is Trojan Free.
Table 3.1 Comparison of TT values for Trojan inserted in segment 2 with Trojan Free
Circuit
Case

X-Input Pattern

Trojan

Seg1
(µV)

Y-Input Pattern
1

2

3

Seg2 (µV)
TF

TA

Seg3

Seg4

(µV)

(µV)

0000 0000 0000 0000

Buffer

13.51

13.31

13.32

13.31

13.12

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

13.51

13.31

13.35

13.31

13.12

Mux-2

13.51

13.31

13.38

13.31

13.12

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

14.03

13.83

13.84

13.83

13.64

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

14.03

13.83

13.86

13.83

13.64

Mux-2

14.03

13.83

13.9

13.83

13.64

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

11.66

12.75

12.76

12.75

12.11

1111 0000 0000 0111

Mux-1

11.66

12.75

12.78

12.75

12.11

Mux-2

11.66

12.75

12.82

12.75

12.11

From Table 3.1, comparison results show that, TT values for segments-1, 3 and 4, for
Trojan Free and Trojan Attacked for all the cases are constant for a given input pattern.
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There is no measured voltage change in those segments for a given input pattern. In reality,
as we have only post-fab circuit, we cannot compare Trojan Attacked circuit with Trojan
Free circuit. But, we can compare the voltage change in the segments 2 and 3 of a post-fab
circuit.
Voltage Change = VSeg2 – VSeg3

(3.1)

Table 3.2 TT values for Trojan attacked in segment 2
Case

X-Input Pattern

Trojan

Trojan Attack Seg2
Seg2(µV) Seg3(µV) Seg2 – Seg3

Y-Input Pattern
1

2

3

0000 0000 0000 0000

Buffer

13.32

13.31

0.01

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

13.35

13.31

0.04

Mux-2

13.38

13.31

0.07

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

13.84

13.83

0.01

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

13.86

13.83

0.03

Mux-2

13.9

13.83

0.07

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

12.76

12.75

0.01

1111 0000 0000 0111

Mux-1

12.78

12.75

0.03

Mux-2

12.82

12.75

0.07
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From Table 3.2, for a trojan attacked in segment-2, for the three cases, the measured
voltage change is observed. When Buffer is inserted in the segment-2, the measured
voltages are 13.32 µV, 13.84 µV and 12.76 µV for the three cases-1, 2, 3 in the segment2. From Table 3.2 and equation (3.1), there is a measurable voltage change of 0.01 µV
between segment-2 and segment-3, for all the cases, when Buffer is present in the segment2. When a Multiplexer is present in the Segment-2, the measured voltage for the three cases
are 13.35 µV, 13.86 µV and 12.78 µV in the segment-2. From Table 3.2 and equation (3.1),
there is a measurable voltage change of 0.04 µV in the first case and 0.03 µV in the second
and third cases. When the trojan Mux-2 is present in Segment-2, the measured voltages are
13.38 µV, 13.9 µV and 12.82 µV in the segment-2. From Table 3.2 and equation (3.1), the
measurable voltage change is 0.07 µV in all the cases. In summary, from Table 3.2, the
voltage change increases between the segments-2 and 3, as the size of the trojan increases.
3.2.1 Histogram Plots for Trojan Free and Trojan Attacked Circuits
As a post-fab circuit is having PVT (Process, Voltage and Temperature) variations. In
addition to TT-values, voltage across one-ohm resistor is measured by considering
mismatch and process variation in Monte Carlo simulation at 250 samples. These measured
values in each segment are plotted in the Histogram plots. Fig. 3.5 – Fig. 3.16 Shows the
Histogram plots for the Monte Carlo Analysis data at 250 points for all the cases (Cases 1,
2, and 3). Fig. 3.5 – Fig. 3.8 shows the Histogram Plots for the Trojan Free Circuit, Buffer
in the Seg2, Mux-1 in the Seg2, Mux-2 in the Seg2, for the case1. Each figure consists of
2 plots, where the to plot is the plotted values for the segment-2, and the bottom plot is the
plotted values for the segment-3. Mean and Standard Deviation values are obtained from
the Histogram plots and the results are summarized after Fig. 3.16.
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Fig. 3.5 For case1, Histogram Plot for segments-2 and 3 for Trojan Free Circuit.
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Fig. 3.6 For case1, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Buffer is present in
Seg2.
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Fig. 3.7 For case1, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-1 is present in Seg2
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Fig. 3.8 For case1, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-2 is present in
Seg2
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Fig. 3.9 – Fig. 3.12 shows the Histogram Plots for Monte Carlo simulation at 250 samples
for the case2, for the Trojan Free Circuit, Buffer as Trojan in the Seg2, Mux as Trojan in
the Seg2, two multiplexers as Trojan in the Seg2. Mean and Standard Deviation values are
obtained from the plots. The results are summarized after the fig. 3.16.

Fig. 3.9 For case2, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 for Trojan Free Circuit.
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Fig. 3.10 For case2, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Buffer is present in
Seg2.
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Fig. 3.11 For case2, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-1 is present in
Seg2.
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Fig. 3.12 For case2, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-2 is present in
Seg2.
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. Fig. 3.13 – Fig. 3.16 shows the Histogram Plots for the Trojan Free Circuit, Buffer as
Trojan in the Seg2, Mux as Trojan in the Seg2, two multiplexers as Trojan in the Seg2, for
the case3. Mean and Standard Deviation values are summarized after fig. 3.16.

Fig. 3.13 For case3, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 for Trojan Free Circuit.
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Fig. 3.14 For case2, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Buffer is present in
Seg2
31

Fig. 3.15 For case3, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-1 is present in
Seg2

32

Fig. 3.16 For case3, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-2 is present in
Seg2.
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The obtained values of Mean and Standard Deviation from Histogram Plots are tabulated
in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4.
Table 3.3 Mean values from the Histogram Plots from Fig. 3.5 – Fig. 3.16.
Case

1

Trojan Attack Seg2

15.6013

15.6013

Buffer

15.6137

15.6013

Mux-1

15.6409

15.6013

Mux-2

15.6805

15.6013

16.2671

16.2671

Buffer

16.2795

16.2671

Mux-1

16.3067

16.2671

Mux-2

16.3462

16.2671

15.00231

15.00231

Buffer

15.0125

15.00231

Mux-1

15.0397

15.00231

Mux-2

15.0793

15.00231

Trojan Free

Trojan

3

Seg3 (µV)

Trojan Free

Trojan

2

Seg2 (µV)

Trojan Free

Trojan
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Table 3.4 Standard Deviation values from the Histogram Plots from Fig. 3.5 – Fig. 3.16.
Case

1

Trojan Attack Seg2

7.97747

7.97747

Buffer

7.98524

7.97747

Mux-1

7.99560

7.97747

Mux-2

8.01374

7.97747

8.57607

8.57607

Buffer

8.58384

8.57607

Mux-1

8.59408

8.57607

Mux-2

8.61209

8.57607

7.78669

7.78669

Buffer

7.79413

7.78669

Mux-1

7.80450

7.78669

Mux-2

7.82265

7.78669

Trojan Free

Trojan

3

Seg3 (µV)

Trojan Free

Trojan

2

Seg2 (µV)

Trojan Free

Trojan

From the Histogram plots, for a given input patterns (case1, case2, case3). Ideally,
in a noise free environment, the mean values are same in the segments-2 and 3 for a Trojan
Free circuit. For the Case1, the mean values of the segments-2 and 3 are 15.6013 µV for a
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Trojan Free circuit. For a Trojan Free circuit, for Case2, the mean values of the segments2 and 3 are 16.2671 µV. For Case3, the mean values of the segments-2 and 3 are 15.00231
µV for a Trojan Free circuit.
When a Trojan is inserted in the segment-2, change in the mean values are
observed between the segments-2 and 3. For Case1, When Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the
observed mean values from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.6137 µV
and 15.6013 µV. For Case1, when a Multiplexer is inserted as Trojan, the observed mean
values from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.6409 µV and 15.6013 µV.
For Case1, when two multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from
the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.6805 µV and 15.6013 µV.
For Case2, when a Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the
Histogram plots are 16.2795 µV and 16.2671 µV for the segments-2 and 3. For Case2,
when a Multiplexer is inserted as trojan, the observed mean values from the Histogram
plots are 16.3067 µV and 16.2671 µV for the segments-2 and 3. For Case2, when two
multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the Histogram plots for
the segments-2 and 3 are 16.3462 µV and 16.2671 µV.
For Case3, When Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the
Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.0125 µV and 15.00231 µV. For Case3,
when a Multiplexer is inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the Histogram
plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.0397 µV and 15.00231 µV. For Case3, when two
multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the Histogram plots for
the segments-2 and 3 are 15.0793 µV and 15.00231 µV.
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From the above observation, as the size of the Trojan increases, the difference
between the mean values between the segments-2 and 3 increases.
In the same way, from the Histogram plots, for a given input patterns (case1,
case2, case3). Ideally, in a noise free environment, Standard Deviation values are same in
segments-2 and 3 for a Trojan Free circuit. For the Case1, the Standard Deviation of the
segments-2 and 3 are 7.97747 µV for a Trojan Free circuit. For a Trojan Free circuit, for
Case2, the Standard Deviation of the segments-2 and 3 are 8.57607 µV. For Case3, the
Standard Deviation of the segments-2 and 3 are 7.78669 µV for a Trojan Free circuit.
When a Trojan is inserted in the segment-2, change in the Standard Deviation are
observed between the segments-2 and 3. For Case1, When Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the
observed Standard Deviation from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are
7.98524 µV and 7.97747 µV. For Case1, when a Multiplexer is inserted as Trojan, the
observed Standard Deviation from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are
7.99560 µV and 7.97747 µV. For Case1, when two multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the
observed Standard Deviation from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are
8.01374 µV and 7.97747 µV.
For Case2, when a Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation
from the Histogram plots are 8.58384 µV and 8.57607 µV for the segments-2 and 3. For
Case2, when a Multiplexer is inserted as trojan, the observed Standard Deviation from the
Histogram plots are 8.59408 µV and 8.57607µV for the segments-2 and 3. For Case2, when
two multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation from the
Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 8.61209 µV and 8.57607 µV.
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For Case3, When Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation
from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 7.79413 µV and 7.78669 µV. For
Case3, when a Multiplexer is inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation from the
Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 7.80450 µV and 7.78669 µV. For Case3,
when two multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation from the
Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 7.82265 µV and 7.78669 µV.
From the above observation, as the size of the Trojan increases, the difference
between the Standard Deviation between the segments-2 and 3 increases.
From the tables 3.3 and 3.4, the trojan attacked segment(segment-2) is having the
mean and standard deviation values higher than the trojan free segment(segment-3). In
addition, as the size of trojan is increasing, the voltage difference between the segments-2
and 3 increases in all the cases.
3.3 Measured Voltage across one-ohm resistor when segment-3 is Trojan Attacked
Voltage across one-ohm resistor is measured when trojan is inserted in the segment3. The typical-typical values for Trojan Free and Trojan attacked circuits for three cases
(case1, case2, case3) are shown in the Table 3.5. Buffer, Mux-1, Mux-2 are considered as
three different trojans in the three circuits.
From Table 3.5, comparison results show that, TT values for segments-1, 3 and 4, for
Trojan Free and Trojan Attacked for all the cases are constant for a given input pattern.
There is no measured voltage change in those segments for a given input pattern. In reality,
as we have only post-fab circuit, we cannot compare Trojan Attacked circuit with Trojan
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Free circuit. But, we can compare the voltage change in the segments 2 and 3 of a post-fab
circuit.
Voltage Change = VSeg3 – VSeg2

(3.2)

Table 3.5 Comparison of TT values for Trojan inserted in segment 3 with Trojan Free
Circuit
Case

X-Input Pattern

Trojan

Y-Input Pattern
1

2

3

Seg1

Seg2

(µV)

(µV)

Seg3 (µV)
TF

TA

Seg4
(µV)

0000 0000 0000 0000

Buffer

13.51

13.31

13.31

13.32

13.12

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

13.51

13.31

13.31

13.35

13.12

Mux-2

13.51

13.31

13.31

13.38

13.12

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

14.03

13.83

13.83

13.84

13.64

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

14.03

13.83

13.83

13.86

13.64

Mux-2

14.03

13.83

13.83

13.9

13.64

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

11.66

12.75

12.75

12.76

12.11

1111 0000 0000 0111

Mux-1

11.66

12.75

12.75

12.79

12.11

Mux-2

11.66

12.75

12.75

12.82

12.11
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Table 3.6 TT values for Trojan attacked in segment 3
Case

X-Input Pattern

Trojan

Trojan Attack Seg3
Seg2(µV) Seg3(µV) Seg3 – Seg2

Y-Input Pattern
1

2

3

0000 0000 0000 0000

Buffer

13.31

13.32

0.01

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

13.31

13.35

0.04

Mux-2

13.31

13.38

0.07

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

13.83

13.84

0.01

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

13.83

13.86

0.03

Mux-2

13.83

13.9

0.07

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

12.75

12.76

0.01

1111 0000 0000 0111

Mux-1

12.75

12.79

0.04

Mux-2

12.75

12.82

0.07

From Table 3.6, for a trojan attacked in segment-3, for the three cases, the measured
voltage change is observed. When Buffer is inserted in the segment-3, the measured
voltages are 13.32 µV, 13.84 µV and 12.76 µV for the three cases-1, 2, 3 in the segment2. From Table 3.6 and equation (3.2), there is a measurable voltage change of 0.01 µV
between segment-2 and segment-3, for all the cases, when Buffer is present in the segment3. When a Multiplexer is present in the Segment-3, the measured voltage for the three cases
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are 13.35 µV, 13.86 µV and 12.79 µV in the segment-3. From Table 3.6 and equation (3.2),
there is a measurable voltage change of 0.04 µV in the first and third case and 0.03 µV in
the second case. When the trojan Mux-2 is present in Segment-2, the measured voltages
are 13.38 µV, 13.9 µV and 12.82 µV in the segment-2. From Table 3.2 and equation (3.1),
the measurable voltage change is 0.07 µV in all the cases. From Table 3.6, the voltage
change increases between the segments-2 and 3, as the size of the trojan increases. As the
size of the trojan increases, results in extra load to the circuit, which results in the extra
leakage current, which results in extra voltage when measured across one-ohm resistor. In
summary, voltage difference between the Trojan Attacked and Trojan Free segments
increases, as size of the trojan increases.
3.3.1 Histogram Plots for Trojan Attacked Circuits in Segment 3
In addition to TT-values, when Monte Carlo analysis is performed by considering
mismatch and process variation at 250 samples when the circuit is trojan attacked in the
segment-3. Fig. 3.17 – Fig. 3.25 Shows the Histogram plots obtained from the Monte Carlo
Analysis data at 250 points for all the cases (Cases 1, 2, and 3). Fig. 3.17 – Fig. 3.19 shows
the Histogram Plots for the Trojan Attacked Circuits, where Buffer as Trojan in the
Segment-3, Mux-1 in the Seg3, Mux-2 in the Seg3, for the case1. The top plot in each
figure represents the values obtained from segment-2, bottom plot shows the values
obtained from segment-3. The results for these plots are summarized after Fig. 3.25.
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Fig. 3.17 For case1, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Buffer is present in
Seg3.
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Fig. 3.18 For case1, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-1 is present in
Seg3.
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Fig. 3.19 For case1, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-2 is present in
Seg3.
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Fig. 3.20 – Fig. 3.22 shows the Histogram Plots for the Trojan Attacked Circuits, where
Buffer as Trojan in the Seg3, Mux as Trojan in the Seg3, two multiplexers as Trojan in the
Seg3, for the case2.

Fig. 3.20 For case2, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Buffer is present in
Seg3.
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Fig. 3.21 For case2, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-1 is present in
Seg3.
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Fig. 3.22 For case2, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-2 is present in
Seg3.
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Fig. 3.23 – Fig. 3.25 shows the Histogram Plots for the Trojan Attacked Circuits, where
Buffer as Trojan in the Seg3, Mux-1 in the Seg3, Mux-2 in the Seg3, for the case3.

Fig. 3.23 For case3, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Buffer is present in
Seg3.
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Fig. 3.24 For case3, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-1 is present in
Seg3.
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Fig. 3.25 For case3, Histogram Plot for the segments-2 and 3 when Mux-2 is present in
Seg3.
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The obtained values of Mean and Standard Deviation from Histogram Plots are tabulated
in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8.
Table 3.7 Mean values from the Histogram Plots from Fig. 3.17 – Fig. 3.25.
Case

1

Trojan Attack Seg3

15.6013

15.6013

Buffer

15.6013

15.6137

Mux-1

15.6013

15.6409

Mux-2

15.6013

15.6805

16.2671

16.2671

Buffer

16.2671

16.2795

Mux-1

16.2671

16.3067

Mux-2

16.2671

16.3462

15.0002

15.0002

Buffer

15.0002

15.0147

Mux-1

15.0002

15.0419

Mux-2

15.0002

15.0814

Trojan Free

Trojan

3

Seg3 (µV)

Trojan Free

Trojan

2

Seg2 (µV)

Trojan Free

Trojan
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Table 3.8 Standard Deviation values from the Histogram Plots from Fig. 3.17 – Fig. 3.25.
Case

1

Trojan Attack Seg3

7.97747

7.97747

Buffer

7.97747

7.98524

Mux-1

7.97747

7.99560

Mux-2

7.97747

8.01374

8.57607

8.57607

Buffer

8.57607

8.58384

Mux-1

8.57607

8.59408

Mux-2

8.57607

8.61209

7.78635

7.78635

Buffer

7.78635

7.79447

Mux-1

7.78635

7.80484

Mux-2

7.78635

7.82299

Trojan Free

Trojan

3

Seg3 (µV)

Trojan Free

Trojan

2

Seg2 (µV)

Trojan Free

Trojan
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From the Histogram plots, for a given input patterns (case1, case2, case3). Ideally,
in a noise free environment, the mean values are same in the segments-2 and 3 for a Trojan
Free circuit. For the Case1, the mean values of the segments-2 and 3 are 15.6013 µV for a
Trojan Free circuit. For a Trojan Free circuit, for Case2, the mean values of the segments2 and 3 are 16.2671 µV. For Case3, the mean values of the segments-2 and 3 are 15.0002
µV for a Trojan Free circuit.
When a Trojan is inserted in the segment-3, change in the mean values are
observed between the segments-2 and 3. For Case1, When Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the
observed mean values from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.6013 µV
and 15.6137 µV. For Case1, when a Multiplexer is inserted as Trojan, the observed mean
values from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.6013 µV and 15.6409 µV.
For Case1, when two multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from
the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.6013 µV and 15.6805 µV.
For Case2, when a Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the
Histogram plots are 16.2671 µV and 16.2795 µV for the segments-2 and 3. For Case2,
when a Multiplexer is inserted as trojan, the observed mean values from the Histogram
plots are 16.2671 µV and 16.3067 µV for the segments-2 and 3. For Case2, when two
multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the Histogram plots for
the segments-2 and 3 are 16.2671 µV and 16.3462 µV.
For Case3, When Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the
Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.0002 µV and 15.0147 µV. For Case3,
when a Multiplexer is inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the Histogram
plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 15.0002 µV and 15.0419 µV. For Case3, when two
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multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed mean values from the Histogram plots for
the segments-2 and 3 are 15.0002 µV and 15.0814 µV.
From the above observation, as the size of the Trojan increases, the difference
between the mean values between the segments-2 and 3 increases.
In the same way, from the Histogram plots, for a given input patterns (case1,
case2, case3). Ideally, in a noise free environment, Standard Deviation values are same in
segments-2 and 3 for a Trojan Free circuit. For the Case1, the Standard Deviation of the
segments-2 and 3 are 7.97747 µV for a Trojan Free circuit. For a Trojan Free circuit, for
Case2, the Standard Deviation of the segments-2 and 3 are 8.57607 µV. For Case3, the
Standard Deviation of the segments-2 and 3 are 7.78635 µV for a Trojan Free circuit.
When a Trojan is inserted in the segment-3, change in the Standard Deviation are
observed between the segments-2 and 3. For Case1, When Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the
observed Standard Deviation from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are
7.97747 µV and 7.98524 µV. For Case1, when a Multiplexer is inserted as Trojan, the
observed Standard Deviation from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are
7.97747 µV and 7.99560 µV. For Case1, when two multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the
observed Standard Deviation from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are
7.97747 µV and 8.01374 µV.
For Case2, when a Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation
from the Histogram plots are 8.57607 µV and 8.58384 µV for the segments-2 and 3. For
Case2, when a Multiplexer is inserted as trojan, the observed Standard Deviation from the
Histogram plots are 8.57607µV and 8.59408 µV for the segments-2 and 3. For Case2, when
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two multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation from the
Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 8.57607 µV and 8.61209 µV.
For Case3, When Buffer is inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation
from the Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 7.78635 µV and 7.79447 µV. For
Case3, when a Multiplexer is inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation from the
Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 7.78635 µV and 7.80484 µV. For Case3,
when two multiplexers are inserted as Trojan, the observed Standard Deviation from the
Histogram plots for the segments-2 and 3 are 7.78635 µV and 7.82299 µV.
From the above observation, as the size of the Trojan increases, the difference
between the Standard Deviation between the segments-2 and 3 increases.
From the tables 3.7 and 3.8, the trojan attacked segment(segment-3) is having the
mean and standard deviation values higher than the trojan free segment(segment-2). In
addition, as the size of trojan is increasing, the voltage difference between the segments-2
and 3 increases in all the cases. In MonteCarlo Simulation, mismatch and process variations
are considered at 250 points.
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4 HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION TECHNIQUE
In addition to these typical-typical values, Monte Carlo simulation for 250 iterations
for each case helps to find the Probability of false alarm, probability of false negative,
detection probability and trojan overhead.
As we are able to make the two segments having the same leakage current of the
design for a given input pattern. The post-fab leakage current should be close if the two
segment are close in physical layout and each segment is not too big in size. The detection
technique and procedures are:
1) Pre-fab: Monte Carlo analysis with one segment Trojan-free and one segment
Trojan-attack.
250 Monte Carlo samples are used in this thesis.
2) Calculate the voltage difference of these two segments
Delta = Vseg3 – Vseg2

(4.1)

3) The norm detection equation is developed in equation (4.2).
|𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎|

Detection = ((𝑉𝑠𝑒𝑔2+𝑉𝑠𝑒𝑔3)⁄2)

(4.2)

4) Analyze the detection data considering detection probability.
Pick a threshold detection value to meet the detection probability. If the detection
value is above the detection threshold, then there exists a trojan in either Segment-
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2 or Segment-3. A positive delta indicates segment-3 is attacked, otherwise
segment-2 is attacked. As it is a noise free environment, absolute value ‘0’ is taken
as threshold value.
5) The threshold detection value is used for the post-fab detection
Detection probability is the ratio of the no. of detected samples to total no. of
samples(250).
𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

Detection Probability = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜.

𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 (250)

(4.3)

4.1 Probability of false negative
If the trojan size is too small, there is a chance of getting false negatives. Though there
exists a trojan and if some of the detections in the 250 samples are 0’s, it says that trojan
does not exist. Then it is known as false negative. In short, if Detection < threshold voltage,
for a trojan attacked segment, it is false negative.
Probability of false negative is defined as the ratio of false negatives to total no. of samples.
𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠

Probability of false negative = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜.

𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 (250)

(4.4)

4.2 Probability of false alarm
In some cases, though the trojan doesn’t exist, it shows that trojan exists. It shows
Detection > threshold value, for a trojan free segment. It is known as false alarm. Usually,
it happens when noise is considered. But, in this thesis noise is not considered.
Probability of false alarm =

𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 (250)
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(4.5)

4.3 Trojan Overhead
Trojan Overhead is the ratio of the trojan size to the whole circuit. Percentage is calculated
by multiplying the result with 100.
Trojan size

Trojan Overhead = 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 × 100% (4.6)
Trojan Overhead, when Buffer as Trojan in one segment = 0.0158%.
Trojan Overhead, when Multiplexer as Trojan in one segment = 0.0868%.
Trojan Overhead, when two Multiplexers as Trojan in one segment = 0.1737%.
Monte Carlo analysis is done for 250 samples, for case1, 2 and 3, when Buffer as
trojan present in segment-2/3, Mux-1 as trojan present in segment-2/3, Mux-2 as trojan
present in segment-2/3. With the help of equations from (4.1) to (4.6). Detection probability,
probability of false negative, Probability of false alarm and Trojan overhead are calculated.
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Table 4.1 shows the Probability of false negative and probability of false alarm from each
case.
Case

X-Input Pattern

Trojan

Y-Input Pattern

Probability

Probability of

of false

false alarm

negative
1

2

3

0000 0000 0000 0000

Buffer

3.2%

0

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

0%

0

Mux-2

0%

0

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

3.6%

0

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

0%

0

Mux-2

0%

0

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

7.2%

0

1111 0000 0000 0111

Mux-1

0%

0

Mux-2

0%

0
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Table 4.2 Calculated values for the Detection Probability and Trojan Overhead
Case

X-Input Pattern

Trojan Detection Probability

Overhead

Y-Input Pattern

1

2

3

Trojan

0000 0000 0000 0000

Buffer

96.8%

0.0158%

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

100%

0.0868%

Mux-2

100%

0.1737%

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

96.4%

0.0158%

0000 0000 0000 0000

Mux-1

100%

0.0868%

Mux-2

100%

0.1737%

1111 1111 1111 1111

Buffer

92.8%

0.0158%

1111 0000 0000 0111

Mux-1

100%

0.0868%

Mux-2

100%

0.1737%

From Table 4.2, the detectable trojan is 0.0868% of the Host Circuit with 100%
detection probability.
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5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
Post-fab hardware trojan detection technique is developed using equalized segments
with same leakage current. 250 Monte Carlo simulation results show that minimum Trojan
is 0.0868% of the host circuit size with 100% detection Probability.
5.2 Future Work
HT detection technique when all the segments having same leakage current is to be
implemented when noise is added to the source. Absolute threshold value is not considered,
as PVT changes to threshold results in false detection. Develop an on-chip voltage change
detection technique on FPGA.
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